People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna: Pulling in
the Nets on Criminal Street Gangs*
On January 30, 1997, a divided California Supreme Court handed down People ex rel. Gallo v.
Acuna, 1 a landmark opinion that approved the use of civil
injunctions to combat street gang activity. This Casenote
examines the holdings of Acuna, focusing primarily on its
holding with respect to which defendants could be bound
by the injunction. Acuna stated that the injunction was
binding on individual defendants without the necessity of
proof that each defendant possessed a specific intent to
further an unlawful aim embraced by the gang. 2 Although the court was clear what qualities defendants need
not possess in order to be bound. the court did not set a
firm standard for what qualities were actually required.
This Casenote concludes that to avoid the threat of guilt
by association and to ensure that all defendants under an
injunction are justifiably bound, courts should insist upon
a showing that each defendant either ( 1) "actively
participates" in a criminal street gang, as this concept
has been developed in the Street Terrorism Enforcement
and Prevention Act' and cases interpreting the Act or (2)
possesses a specific intent to further an unlawful aim
* B.A., University of Pennsylvania; J.D. candidate, University of San Diego
School of Law, 1998. The author will be joining the Los Angeles office of Musick,
Peeler & Garrett in the Fall of 1998, where he can be reached via e-mail at
e.mcclellan#mpglaw.com. Special thanks to Professors Paul Horton and Jean Montoya,
and to my wife, Kerri. This Casenote is dedicated to my grandmother, Glenna Wilcox,
who always read to me when I was little.
I. 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997), cert. denied, Gonzalez v. Gallo, 117 S. Ct. 2513
(I 997).
2. Id. at 616-18.
3. CAL. PEN. CODE§§ 186.20-196.28 (Deering Supp. 1998). Although the STEP
Act itself does not explicitly define "actively participates," case law interpreting the Act
does provide such a definition. See infra Part V.
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embraced by the gang. A showing of either alternative
demonstrates that the individual defendant in some way
contributes to the public nuisance that it is the
injunction's purpose to end. A showing of the former
alternative does so by indicating an individual's level of
involvement in the gang such that the involvement in itself
contributes to the public nuisance.
l.

INTRODUCTION

California has a gang problem. In 1993, the California Department of
Justice estimated that there could be as many as 180,000 gang members
throughout the state. 4 The days when gangs were strictly a phenomenon
of major metropolitan areas such as Los Angeles are gone. 5 Amidst the
redwood forests of Sonoma County, local sheriff's deputies have
estimated that gang membership jumped from 300 in 1991 to 1050 in
1997. 6 Traditionally placid Ventura and Santa Barbara Counties were
estimated to have 8000 and 2000 gang members respectively in 1997. 7
As gang membership across the state remains strong, so remains the
gangs' involvement in crime. 8 According to the California Legislature,
"the State of California is in a state of crisis which has been caused by
violent street gangs whose members threaten, terrorize, and commit a
multitude of crimes against the peaceful citizens of their neighborhoods. "9

4. See KAREN L. KINNEAR, GANGS: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 74 (1996)
(reporting on the Department of Justice findings). Of the 180,000, the Department of
Justice estimated that approximately 95,000 were Hispanic, 65,000 were African
American, 15,000 were Asian, and 5,000 were white. Id.
5. One expert has estimated that in Los Angeles County alone there were 150,000
gang members in 1992. See Malcolm W. Klein, Framing the Juvenile Justice Problem:
The Reality Behind the Problem, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 860, 861 (1996). Sources indicate
that as of April 1997 these numbers had not fallen. See Paul Hefner, Governor Supports
Bill to Deter Gang Recruiting, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 11, 1997, at NI (citing estimates
of I 50,000 gang members in Los Angeles County).
6. See Susan Ferriss, Teen Gangs: The Crazy Life Sweeping Sonoma County
"Gangs/a" Culture Is Steadily Catching on among Bored Suburban Youths, S. F.
EXAMINER, Mar. 30, 1997, at DI.
7. See Scott Hadly, Santa Barbara Police Join Local Agencies in Gang
Crackdown, L.A. TIMES (Ventura County ed.), Mar. 30, 1997, at Bl.
8. For instance, in the City of Los Angeles, gang-related homicides accounted for
34% of total homicides in 1990 and 36% in 1991. See IRVING A. SPERGEL, THE YOUTH
GANG PROBLEM: A COMMUNITY APPROACH 34 (I 995) (describing the upward trend of
youth gang violence in several locales, including parts of California). In the City of Los
Angeles in 1995, 45% of all homicides were gang-related. See G. David Curry & Scott
H. Decker, What's in a Name?: A Gang by Any Other Name Isn't Quite the Same, 31
VAL. U. L. REV. 501, 501 (1997).
9. CAL. PEN. CODE§ 186.21 (Deering Supp. 1998).

344

[VOL. 35: 343, 1998[

People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

California's law enforcement agencies, 10 Legislature, and prosecutorial agencies have responded to the gang problem in a number of ways.
The Legislature's most significant response was the 1988 enactment of
the Street Terrorism and Prevention (STEP) Act, 11 the goal of which
was "to seek the eradication of criminal activities by street gangs." 12
The STEP Act includes a number of provisions to accomplish this goal,
including a sentence-enhancement provision for persons convicted of any
felony that was committed in association with a criminal street gang. 13
The STEP Act also creates a separate criminal offense for active,
participating gang members who willfully assist in any felonious
criminal conduct by members of that gang. 14 Courts of appeal have
held that each of these two provisions is constitutional. 15
Prosecutorial agencies have been creative in their response to the gang
problem. Some agencies have created special units that concentrate on
the prosecution of gang members. 16 Other agencies have cracked down
on truancy, prosecuting parents who fail to send their children to

10. One of the suppressive tactics used by police departments are "sweeps" of
suspected gang members. In these sweeps police canvass a neighborhood, questioning
anyone they suspect of gang membership. This questioning may turn up outstanding
warrants or other causes for an immediate arrest. See Susan L. Burrell, Gang Evidence:
Issues for Criminal Defense, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 739, 742-43 (1990) (describing
such sweeps); Klein, supra note 5, at 863 (same). Many law enforcement agencies
fighting a gang problem have also created special gang units that can serve as expert
witnesses in court. See Malcolm W. Klein, What Are Street Gangs When They Get to
Court?, 31 VAL U. L. REV. 515,518 (1996). Individuals from these units gain expertise
in the behavior of specific gangs whose members are being prosecuted. See id.
11. CAL. PEN. CODE§§ 186.20-196.28.
12. Id. § 186.21.
13. Id. § 186.22(b). Courts have held that unlike subdivision (a) of § 186.22,
subdivision (b) punishes a defendant regardless of his knowledge of the gang's prior
criminal activity. See People v. Gamez, 286 Cal. Rptr. 894, 904 (1991).
14. CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(a). The STEP Act further offers a nuisance
provision to enjoin a "building or place" used by gang members to commit certain
enumerated criminal offenses, see id. § 186.22a, creates a separate offense for coercing
participation in gang activity, see id. § 186.26, and creates a separate offense for anyone
who supplies a firearm to a gang member with knowledge that the gang member will
use the firearm to commit any of certain enumerated felonies, see id. § 186.28.
15. See People v. Green, 278 Cal. Rptr. 140, 148-49 (1991) (holding that section
l 86.22(a) "does not invade the area of protected freedoms and is not unconstitutionally
overbroad"); Gamez, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 900-05 (affirming the constitutional validity of
both subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 186.22).
16. See Klein, supra note 10, at 518 (describing such gang prosecution units).
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school. 17 The most noteworthy, and perhaps effective, method of
prosecutorial agencies in the past decade, however, has been the use of
the age-old civil injunction. 18 Prosecutors file a complaint with the
court, requesting an injunction to abate gang activity in a certain target
area, which activity the prosecutors contend constitutes a public
nuisance. The injunctions typically enjoin a range of otherwise legal
conduct, as well as conduct that is independently proscribed by the Penal
Code. 19 Common provisions include prohibitions against possessing
various weapons, prohibitions against annoying or harassing residents of
the target area, and prohibitions against possessing various instruments
that might be used to apply graffiti or break into locked vehicles. 20
Violation of the injunction can result in civil contempt proceedings or
criminal misdemeanor charges. 21
Following the issuance of California's first anti-gang injunction in
1987, 22 the constitutional validity of such injunctions overall,23 as well
as common individual provisions, remained in question for several years.
Certain commentators asserted that provisions prohibiting gang members

17. See Burrell, supra note 10, at 744 (discussing the Los Angeles District
Attorney Office's employment of this tactic).
I 8. According to the California Supreme Court, an injunction "operates on the
person of the defendant by commanding him to do or desist from certain action."
Comfort v. Comfort, 112 P.2d 259, 262 (Cal. 1941).
19. See People v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 607 (Cal. 1997) (holding that public
nuisance injunctions can be valid as to conduct that is not independently proscribed by
the Penal Code).
20. All of these prohibitions were present, for instance, in the orders granting
preliminary injunction in People v. Blythe Street Gang, No. LC020525 (Cal. Super. Ct.
L.A. County, Apr. 7, 1993); People ex rel. City Attorney v. Acuna, No. 729322 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, Mar. 10, 1993), and People v. Varrio Posole Locos, No.
N76652 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Diego County, Dec. 11, 1997).
21. See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 607 (Cal. 1997) (validating
both of these remedies).
22. See People v. Playboy Gangster Crips, No. WEC 118860 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A.
County Dec. 11, 1987) (order granting preliminary injunction).
23. For instance, some authors have suggested that anti-gang injunctions deprive
defendants of constitutional procedural protections normally bestowed upon criminal
defendants. See Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to
Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil
Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1394-1404 (1991); Christopher S. Yoo,
Comment, The Constitutionality of Enjoining Criminal Street Gangs as Public Nuisances
89 Nw. U. L. REV. 212, 253-66 (1994). At least two courts resisted the swell of
anti-gang injunctions issued by courts after 1992 by declining to issue the requested
injunctions. Both relied in part on constitutional considerations. See id. at 221
(describing orders denying preliminary injunction in People v. "B" Street Boys, No.
735405 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County June 17, 1994) and People ex rel. Jones v.
Amaya, No. 713223 (Cal. Super. Ct. Orange County Nov. 10, 1993)).
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from associating in public view violated freedom of peaceable assembly, 24 provisions prohibiting the wearing of gang clothing and the use
of gang hand signs violated the right of freedom of expression, 25
Commentators also assailed other common provisions, such as those
prohibiting gang members from annoying or harassing residents, as being
vague and overbroad in violation of the right to due process, 26
The first appellate challenge to anti-gang injunctions came in April
1995, when the Court of Appeal for the Sixth District handed down
People ex rel, Gallo v, Acuna, 27 an appeal from a preliminary injunc-

24. See Terence R. Boga, Note, Turf Wars: Street Gangs, Local Governments, and
the Battle fi,r Public Space, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 477, 499-502 ("While gang
members do not regularly meet for political purposes, the public congregation provision
of nuisance abatement injunctions threatens their exercise of the right to peaceable
assembly.").
25. See Yoo, supra note 23, at 239-45; Paul D. Murphy, Comment, Restricting
Gang Clothing in Public Schools: Does a Dress Code Violate a Student's Right of Free
Expression?, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1321.
26. See Yoo, supra note 23, at 251-52; California Supreme Court to Hear
Challenge to San Jose Anti-Gang Injunction (visited Feb. 4, 1998) <http://www.aclu.org/
news/n 102996b.html> (from the American Civil Liberties Union Freedom Network,
News & Events newsletter of October 29, 1996).
27. 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 589 (I 995). The order granting preliminary injunction
enjoined defendants from:
(a) Standing, sitting, walking, driving, gathering or appearing anywhere in
public view with any other defendant herein, or with any other known "VST"
(Varrio Sureiio Town or Varrio Sureiio Truces) or "VSL" (Varrio Sureiio
Locos) member;
(b) Drinking alcoholic beverages in public excepting consumption on lawfully
licensed premises, or using drugs;
(c) Possessing any weapons including but not limited to knives, dirks, daggers,
clubs, nunchukas, BB guns, concealed or loaded firearms, and any other illegal
weapons as defined in the California Penal Code, and any object capable of
serious bodily injury including but not limited to the following: metal pipes
or rods, glass bottles, rocks, bricks, chains, tire irons, screwdrivers, hammers,
crowbars, bumper jacks, spikes, razor blades[,] razors, sling shots, marbles,
ball bearings;
(d) Engaging in fighting in the public streets, alleys, and/or public and private
property;
(e) Using or possessing marker pens, spray paint cans, nails, razor blades,
screwdrivers, or other sharp objects capable of defacing private or public
property;
(f) Spray painting or otherwise applying graffiti on any public or private
property, including but not limited to the street, alley, residences, block walls,
vehicles, and/or any other real or personal property;
(g) Trespassing on or encouraging others to trespass on any private property;
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tion issued by the Superior Court of Santa Clara County against
thirty-eight named individuals of two street gangs operating in the
Rocksprings neighborhood of San Jose. The Sixth District upheld the
injunction generally, finding that all of the provisions that enjoined
criminal conduct were valid. 28 As for provisions (v) and (w), the two

(h) Blocking free ingress and egress to the public sidewalks or street, or any
driveways leading or appurtenant thereto in "Rocksprings";
(i) Approaching vehicles, engaging in conversation, or otherwise communicating with the occupants of any vehicle or doing anything to obstruct or delay
the free flow of vehicular or pedestrian traffic;
(j) Discharging any firearms;
(k) In any manner confronting, intimidating, annoying, harassing, threatening,
challenging, provoking, assaulting and/or battering any residents or patrons, or
visitors to "Rocksprings", or any other persons who are known to have
complained about gang activities, including any persons who have provided
information in support of this Complaint and requests for Temporary
Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and Permanent Injunction;
(I) Causing, encouraging, or participating in the use, possession and/or sale of
narcotics;

(m) Owning, possessing or driving a vehicle found to have any contraband,
narcotics, or illegal or deadly weapons;
(n) Using or possessing pagers or beepers in any public place;
(o) Possessing channel lock pliers, picks, wire cutters, dent pullers, sling shots,
marbles, steel shot, spark plugs, rocks, screwdrivers, "slim jims" and other
devices capable of being used to break into locked vehicles;
(p) Demanding entry into another person's residence at any time of the day or
night;
(q) Sheltering, concealing or permitting another person to enter into a
residence not their own when said person appears to be running, hiding, or
otherwise evading a law enforcement officer;
(r) Signal[l]ing to or acting as a lookout for other persons to warn of the
approach of police officers and soliciting, encouraging, employing or offering
payment to others to do the same;
(s) Climbing any tree, wall, or fence, or passing through any wall or fence by
using tunnels or other holes in such structures;
(t) Littering in any public place or place open to public view;
(u) Urinating or defecating in any public place or place open to public view;
(v) Using words, phrases, physical gestures, or symbols commonly known as
hand signs or engaging in other forms of communication which describe or
refer to the gang known "VST" or "VSL" as described in this Complaint or
any of the accompanying pleadings or declarations;
(w) Wearing clothing which bears the name or letters of the gang known as
"VST" or "VSL";
(x) Making, causing, or encouraging others to make loud noise of any kind,
including but not limited to yelling and loud music at any time of the day or
night.
(y) This injunction shall expire one year from today's date or upon the
granting or denial of a permanent injunction, whichever shall occur first.
Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, People ex rel. City Attorney v. Acuna, No.
729322 (Cal. Super. Ct Santa Clara County Mar. 10, 1993). The text of the order
granting preliminary injunction appears in Acuna, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592 n.1.
28. Id. at 595.
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provisions dealing specifically with speech and with expressive conduct
(gang hand signs and clothing), the court held that "[t]he First Amendment strictly forbids such restrictions." 29 The court struck down
provisions (a), (e), (i), (k), (m), (n) (o), (q), (r), (s), and (x) as either
vague, overbroad, or both. 30 The court modified (c), (k), and (I) to
avoid infirmities of vagueness and overbreadth. 31
Finally, the Sixth District held that of the six named defendants who
appealed whether they should be bound by the injunction, one demonstrated an inadequate foundation to impose civil liability upon her. 32
To bind a defendant to an anti-gang injunction, "[t]here must be some
personal, individual participation [by the defendant] in the illegal
conduct for that conduct to be restrained. " 33 The court found that the
prosecution had not made such a showing in the case of one of the
defendants, Blanca Guzman, against whom the only evidence was that
she had dressed Sureiio-style, claimed gang membership, and was seen
in both Rocksprings and in a rival gang's neighborhood. 34
The California Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal's determination that the gangs' activities in Rocksprings constituted a public
nuisance. 35 However, the court reversed the judgment of the Court of
Appeal insofar as it invalidated provisions (a) and (k) of the preliminary
injunction, the only two provisions that the City of San Jose chose to
appeal. 36 The court also concluded that there was sufficient evidence
to bind defendant Blanca Guzman to the injunction's terms. 37
This Casenote examines the California Supreme Court's review of
Acuna. Part II of this Casenote gives an overview of the mechanics of
an anti-gang injunction, including the statutory provisions that come into
play. Part III offers a brief history of the development of anti-gang
injunctions in California and offers conflicting arguments about whether
these injunctions have successfully curbed gang-related crime and
nuisances. Part IV reviews the California Supreme Court's decision in

29.
30.
3 I.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 596.
See id. at 597-600.
See id.
See id. at 600-03.
Id. at 602.
Id.

See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 614-16 (Cal. 1997).
See id. at 607- 16.
See id. at 617-18.
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Acuna, exploring the implications of the court's various holdings. Part
V zeroes in on the court's analysis of who may properly be bound by an
anti-gang injunction. In its analysis, the Acuna court observed that it
was the gangs, acting their membership, that created the public nuisance
in Rocksprings. 38 All of the gangs' "members," the court seemed to
say, were properly bound by the injunction. In determining who met a
satisfactory definition of gang membership for purposes of this
injunction, the court simply deferred to the City of San Jose's checklist
approach for documenting gang members. The court did not analyze
under what circumstances one's "membership" in a gang necessarily
dictates that he is contributing to the public nuisance. 39 This Casenote
concludes that the Acuna court lost sight of the underlying cause of
action-an action to abate a public nuisance. An individual might be
bound by an anti-gang injunction under Acuna's apparent standard with
no showing that he ever contributed to, or threatened to contribute to,
the public nuisance in question.
Part V then recommends a sensible standard for whom an injunction
may bind that avoids the perils of guilt by association, yet at the same
time keeps law enforcement's hands untied in their battle to eliminate
gang-related crimes and nuisances. Under this standard, courts should
insist upon a showing that each defendant either (1) "actively participates" in any criminal street gang, as this concept has been developed
in the STEP Act40 and cases interpreting the Act, or (2) possesses a
specific intent to further an unlawful aim embraced by the gang. A
showing of either alternative demonstrates that the individual defendant
in some way contributes to the public nuisance which it is the
injunction's purpose to end. The first alternative does so by indicating
an individual's level of involvement in the gang such that the involvement strengthens the gang's power and perpetuates the gang's force as
a public nuisance.
II.

The Mechanics of the Anti-Gang Injunction

Anti-gang injunctions involve a web of provisions from California
Civil, Penal, and Civil Procedure Codes. The prosecuting agency
typically alleges in the complaint that the gang and its members have
occupied and used a certain target area in a manner that constitutes a

38.
39.
40.
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public nuisance under Civil Code sections 3479 and 3480.41 Section
3479 defines a nuisance as:
Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the
illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses,
or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the
comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free
passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay
stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway ....42

Civil Code sections 3480 and 3481 divide the class of nuisances into
public and private. A public nuisance is one which "affects at the same
time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number
of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted
upon individuals may be unequal." 43
A complaint for injunctive relief may also refer to the California Penal
Code's standard for a public nuisance. Section 370 of the Penal Code
combines the characteristics of Civil Code sections 3479 and 3480, but,
as the California Supreme Court pointed out, adds a "distinctively public
quality." 44 It requires that the activity "interfere with the comfortable
enjoyment of life or property by an entire community or neighborhood,
or by any considerable number of persons." 45 In Acuna, the California
Supreme Court meshed the relevant provisions of the Civil and Penal
Codes to arrive at a standard for what constitutes a public nuisance:
The proscribed act may be anything which alternatively is injurious to health
or is indecent, or offensive to the senses; the result[] of the act must interfere
with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property; and those affected by the
act may be an entire neighborhood or a considerable number of persons, and as
amplified by Penal Code section 371 the extent of the annoyance or damage on
the affected individuals may be unequal. 46

The interference mentioned under this standard must be "substantial and
unreasonable" to qualify as a public nuisance. 47 A prosecutorial agency

41. See, e.g., Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction,
and Permanent Injunction to Abate a Public Nuisance, at 3-4, People v. Varrio Posole
Locos, No. N076652 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Diego County Nov. 24, I 997) (No. N076652).
42. CAL. C1v. CODE§ 3479 (Deering Supp. 1998).
43. Id. § 3480.
44. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 604 (Cal. 1997).
45. CAL. PEN. CODE § 370 (Deering Supp. 1998).
46. Acuna, 929 P.2d at 604 (quoting People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room
Theater, 550 P.2d 600, 603 (1976)) (original emphasis from Busch omitted in Acuna).
47. Id. at 604-05.
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filing a complaint for injunctive relief should cite to, or at least be
mindful of, Acuna's meshing of these provisions.
After setting forth the proper standard for what constitutes a public
nuisance, a typical complaint will then paint a portrait of how the gang's
activities meet this standard. 48 The points and authorities in support of
the injunctive relief may cite to specific instances of conduct that form
the nuisance. 49 These instances are provided in the declarations
accompanying the complaint, often attested to by law enforcement
personnel or residents of the target neighborhood. 50
The complaint may name the gang as the sole defendant,5 1 it may
name individual defendants in addition to the gang, 52 or it may name
only individual defendants. 53 The prosecuting agency's decision will
probably depend on strategy. Naming only the gang seems to offer law
enforcement flexibility and may lower the costs of bringing the
injunction. Rather than build a case against each gang member the

48. See, e.g., Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction,
and Permanent Injunction to Abate a Public Nuisance, at 4-5, People v. Varrio Posole
Locos, No. NO76652 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Diego County Nov. 24, 1997).
49. See, e.g., Points and Authorities in Support of Temporary Restraining Order,
Preliminary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction to Abate a Public Nuisance, at 4-5,
People v. Varrio Posole Locos, No. NO76652 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Diego County Nov.
24, 1997).
50. In Acuna, the City of San Jose filed 48 declarations in support of its plea for
injunctive relief. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 601. It takes a significant amount of time for
law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies to acquire and compile all the information
that goes into the declarations. In the City of Oceanside's action against the Varrio
Posole Locos, the City took a full year to get its evidence together before it came to
court. Telephone Interview with Susan Mazza, Special Assistant District Attorney for
the County of San Diego (Apr. 29, 1998).
51. See, e.g., Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction to Abate a
Public Nuisance, People v. Blythe Street Gang No. LC020525 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los
Angeles County Feb. 22, 1993). Acuna specifically ratified a prosecuting agency's
option to name only the gang and not individual gang members. See Acuna, 929 P.2d
at 618. The agency would sue the gang as an unincorporated association, which under
the Code of Civil Procedure may sue or be sued. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 369.5
(Deering Supp. 1998). The Corporations Code defines an "unincorporated association"
as "any partnership or other unincorporated organization of two or more persons,
whether organized for profit or not, but does not include a government or governmental
subdivision or agency." CAL CORP. CODE§ 24000 (Deering 1997). The criteria courts
apply to determine whether an entity is an unincorporated association are (I) that the
group share a common purpose, and (2) that the group function under a common name
under circumstances where fairness requires the group be recognized as a legal entity.
Barr v. United Methodist Church, 153 Cal. Rptr. 322, 327-28 (1979).
52. See, e.g., Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction,
and Permanent Injunction to Abate a Public Nuisance, People v. Varrio Posole Locos,
No. N076652 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Diego County Nov. 24, 1997).
53. See, e.g., Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary and
Permanent Injunctions to Abate a Public Nuisance, People v. Acuna, No. 729322 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Santa Clara County Feb. 26, 1993).
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prosecution intends to bind, the prosecution would only have to build a
case against the gang as a whole. Notwithstanding these possible
advantages, naming only the gang may present problems if a gang
member claims that he or she did not have notice of the injunction. Due
process requires that in order to hold a person amenable to an injunction,
he must have notice of it. 54 If the prosecution names the gang member
and serves him with process, the gang member will have a weak notice
defense.
Once the prosecution makes a successful showing that the gang's
activity constitutes a public nuisance, Civil Code section 3494 authorizes
"any public body or officer" to abate the nuisance. 55 Civil Code
section 3491 defines the statutory remedies for a public nuisance in
California as indictment or information, civil action, or abatement. 56
Drawing upon this authority, courts impose the injunction.
If a defendant violates the injunction, the prosecution has the option
of bringing criminal misdemeanor charges under Penal Code section 372.
Penal Code section 372 provides that any person who maintains or
commits any public nuisance is guilty of a misdemeanor. 57 Each
violation is a separate offense. The defendant's violation of the
injunction would presumably be strong evidence that he is maintaining
or committing a public nuisance for purposes of section 372.
Rather than bring a misdemeanor charge under section 372, the
prosecution will more than likely prosecute the defendant for contempt
of court. Again, each violation would be a separate offense. Assuming
the prosecution decides to bring contempt charges, it then has two
options. 58 First, it might bring an action under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1209, which provides that "[d]isobedience of any lawful
judgment, order, or process of the court" is a contempt of the authority
of the court. 59 The prosecution would apply to the court that issued the
original injunction for an order to show cause. If after considering the
application the court finds reason to believe the defendant violated the
injunction, the court would issue the order, ordering the defendant to

54. See In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548, 554 (I 897).
55. See CAL. CIV. CODE§ 3494 (Deering 1984).
56. See id. § 3491.
57. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 372 (Deering Supp. 1998).
58. See People v. Gonzalez, 910 P.2d 1366, 1373 (Cal. 1996) (observing that the
contempt of a valid court order may be punished in two ways).
59. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 1209(a)(5) (Deering Supp. 1998).
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give the court any legal reason why he should not be found guilty of
contempt. 60 Issuing the order has the effect of commencing a separate
action in the court.
Defendants sued under Code of Civil Procedure section 1209 are not
entitled to a jury trial. 61 If the prosecution carries its burden of proof
at the hearing, the defendant will be punished under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1218, which states that a contemnor may be punished
by a fine of not more than $1,000, or he may be imprisoned in county
jail not more than five days, or both. 62 The court may also order the
defendant to pay the prosecution its attorneys' fees and costs. 63
If a defendant violates a valid injunction, the prosecuting agency's
other option is to bring contempt charges under Penal Code section
166(a)(4). This provision makes it a misdemeanor to engage in
"[ w]illful disobedience of any process or order lawfully issued by any
court." 64 Persons prosecuted under section 166(a)(4) have a state
constitutional and statutory right to a jury trial, 65 which would be tried
in municipal court, not the court that issued the original injunction. If
the prosecution successfully carries its burden of proof at trial, the
contemnor is guilty of a misdemeanor. Under Penal Code section 19,
persons guilty of a misdemeanor may be punished by a fine of not more
than $1,000, or they may be confined in the county jail not more than
six months, or both. 66 The prosecution cannot recover attorneys' fees
and costs.
The prosecuting agency's choice of whether to pursue contempt
charges under Code of Civil Procedure section 1209 or Penal Code
section 166(a)(4) may be influenced by several factors. The advantages
to bringing charges under section 1209 are (1) the burden of proof
against the defendant is only a preponderance of the evidence, (2)
attorneys' fees may be recoverable, and (3) the contemnor possesses no
right of appeal-review of the contempt charge is only by extraordinary
writ, 67 and (4) civil prosecution of juveniles forces parental involve-

60. See Gonzalez, 910 P.2d at 1373 (describing the effect of an order to show
cause).
61. Mitchell v. Superior Court. 783 P.2d 731, 740 (Cal. 1989) ("It has long been
established that the Code of Civil Procedure contempt statute triggers neither a state
constitutional nor statutory right to a jury trial."); CAL. C1v. PROC. CODE § 1218
(Deering Supp. 1998) ("[T]he court or judge" tries the contempt.).
62. CAL. C!V. PROC. CODE§ 1218.
63. Id.
64. CAL. PEN. CODE§ 166(a)(4) (Deering Supp. 1998).
65. Mitchell, 783 P.2d at 740.
66. CAL. PEN. CODE § 19 (Deering Supp. 1998).
67. See People v. Gonzalez, 910 P.2d 1366, 1373 (Cal. 1996) (stating that a
contemnor under Code of Civil Procedure section 1209 may seek review of the contempt
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ment. The prosecution may also opt for section 1209 if it would prefer
a bench trial in superior court, most often before the judge who issued
the original injunction, rather than a jury trial in municipal court with an
unfamiliar judge. Because the California Supreme Court recently
rejected the collateral bar rule, 68 a defendant being tried in municipal
court under section 166(a)(4) may collaterally challenge the validity of
the original injunctive order he is charged with violating. Of course it
is likely that most municipal court judges will uphold the order, simply
in deference to the superior court judge who issued the order and who
might work down the hallway.
One of the distinct advantages to bringing the contempt charge under
section 166(a)(4) is the potential to include as part of a defendant's
probation terms a Fourth Amendment waiver, as well as a pure stay
away order to include the entire target neighborhood. 69 The probationary period would last thirty-six months and violation of probation
receives no jury trial. Other advantages to bringing the contempt charge
under section 166(a)(4) are the longer jail term and speedy trial. The
length of the jail term may be an important consideration if the
defendant is considered a particular menace.
Rather than seek jail time at all, some prosecutors may pursue more
creative punishments. Jule Bishop, an assistant city attorney for the City
of Los Angeles, seeks such punishments as community service,
completion of a drug and alcohol rehabilitation program, or requiring
that the defendant obtain his general equivalency diploma. 70 Ms.
Bishop is particularly inclined to offer these alternative punishments for
offenders who have never been incarcerated, or who are not the main
shot-callers in the gang. She would prefer not having an individual's
violation of a "quality of life" crime be a means to introduce him to
county jail. 71

judgment only by extraordinary writ).
68. See id. at 1375-76.
69. If the defendant lives in the target neighborhood, courts will not allow a pure
stay away as one of the terms. Courts will also be less inclined to include such a term
if the defendant has close family members in the target neighborhood.
70. Telephone Interview with Jule Bishop, Assistant City Attorney for the City of
Los Angeles (May 9, I 998).
7 I. Id.
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III.

ANTI-GANG INJUNCTIONS IN CALIFORNIA: THEIR
HISTORY AND SUCCESS

A.

History

Before taking on the gangs themselves, law enforcement agencies in
California first directed their abatement power against gangs to enjoin
gang-related graffiti. During the early 1980s, the City of Los Angeles
secured court orders against members of three street gangs, declaring the
members' proliferation of graffiti a public nuisance. 72
The first modern anti-gang injunction, focusing on the entirety of a
gang's conduct, was issued by the Los Angeles Superior Court on
December 11, 1987, against the Playboy Gangster Crips. 73 The
provisions of this order were limited to acts that were already illegal
under the Penal Code. 74 No other prosecutorial agency pursued civil
abatement remedies thereafter until October 1992, when the City of
Burbank was awarded an injunction against eighty-eight alleged
members of the Barrio Elmwood Rifa gang. 75 The court's order
included what some might consider the most powerful weapon of the
anti-gang injunction-a provision limiting the defendants' rights to
appear in public with other defendants in the target neighborhood. 76
The City of Burbank's injunction revived interest in civil abatement
as a prosecutorial tool. By October 1996, the Los Angeles County
District Attorney's office had obtained anti-gang injunctions in six cities,

72. See Boga, supra note 24, at 279-80 (describing these injunctions); Burrell,
supra note 10, at 743-44 (same).
73. See Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, People v. Playboy Gangster Crips,
No. WEC 118860 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County Dec. 11, 1987).
74. See id.
75. See Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, People ex rel. Fletcher v. Acosta,
No. EC 010205 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County Nov. 2, 1992).
76. See id. provision (a). Susan Mazza, a special assistant district attorney for the
County of San Diego, commented with regard to the City of Oceanside's injunction
against the Varrio Posole Locos: "The most important tool we have is the association
ban." Gregg Moran, Fighting Criminal Activity with Civil Law: Use of Injunctions as
Policing Tactic on Rise, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Dec. 15, 1997, at Al (quoting
Mazza). Residents of the target neighborhoods laud the association ban provision not
so much for its crime-reducing effect, but because it prevents gang members from
congregating in streets or parks and intimidating pedestrians. The neighborhoods simply
have a more peaceful atmosphere. Telephone Interview with Susan Mazza, supra note
50.
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including Los Angeles, 77 The Santa Clara County District Attorney's
office had issued at least two injunctions, 78
Even as prosecutors' enthusiasm for civil abatement actions mounted,
the actions' constitutional validity were being called into increasing
doubt 79 These doubts took on new proportions in July 1995, when the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth District decided People ex rel, Gallo v,
Acuna, 80 Although the court held that injunctions may "properly be
used to abate gang-related criminal activity as a public nuisance," 81 the
court eliminated or modified fifteen of the injunction's twenty-four
provisions on the grounds that they were overbroad, vague, or an
infringement on free speech, 82
The City Attorney of the City of San Jose appealed only two of the
provisions that the Court of Appeals partially or entirely invalidated-provisions (a) and (k), 83 Provision (a) prohibited defendants from
associating in public view with other defendants, and provision (k)
essentially prohibited defendants from annoying and harassing the people
of Rocksprings, 84 The California Supreme Court, whose opinion is
discussed more thoroughly in Part IV of this Casenote, reversed the
judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it invalidated these two
provisions, The court held that provision (a) did not violate First
Amendment associational rights, and that neither provision was
"overbroad" or "void for vagueness," 85 The Supreme Court also
loosened the Court of Appeal's standard for who may properly be bound
by the injunction, reversing the Court of Appeal's decision that one of

77. See Arleen Jacobius, Going Gangbusters: Prosecutors Fight Gangs with
Injunctions Banning Conduct Such as Using Beepers and Applying Graffiti, A.B.A. J.,
Oct. 1996, at 24, 24.
78. See Yoo, supra note 23, at 219-20.
79. See generally id. (calling into question the constitutional validity of several
aspects of anti-gang injunctions); Boga, supra note 24 (same).
80. 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 589 (1995).
81. Id. at 592.
82. See id. at 595-600. The provisions of the injunction are set forth supra note
27, and the specific terms that the Sixth District eliminated or modified are listed supra
notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
83. See People v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997).
84. For the full text of the preliminary injunction, see supra note 27.
85. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 608-14.
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the defendants was not subject to the injunction's terms. 86 The U.S.
Supreme Court denied defendants' petition for certiorari. 87
The California Supreme Court's decision in Acuna was important to
prosecuting agencies in two major respects. First, the decision had the
effect of depublishing the Sixth District's opinion and stripping its entire
precedential value. 88 Second, the tenor of the opinion suggested the
Supreme Court's endorsement of equity as a means to combat gang
activity. The court spoke strongly of the terror the street gangs
perpetuated89 and on the state's interest in maintaining a civil society.90 The tenor of the opinion, combined with the court's interpretation of the constitutional issues, boded well for the preservation of
anti-gang injunctions in California courts.
The Acuna decision touched off a new rush of anti-gang injunctions.
By April 1997, state courts had granted nearly a dozen injunctions in ten
cities. 91 In July 1997, the City of Los Angeles was awarded an
injunction against eighteen alleged members of the Alsace "set" of the
18th Street Gang. 92 The 18th Street Gang, which may be the largest
gang in Southern California, is believed to have as many as 20,000
members. 93 Sixty percent of these members are believed to be illegal
aliens. 94

86. See id. at 616-18.
87. Gonzalez v. Gallo, 117 S. Ct. 2513 (1997).
88. According to the California Rules of Court, "[u]nless otherwise ordered by the
Supreme Court, no opinion superseded by a grant of review, rehearing, or other action
shall be published." CAL. R. CT. 976(d) (1998). After decision, the Supreme Court may
order the opinion of the court of appeal published in whole or in part. Id.
Because the California Supreme Court has not ordered the Sixth District's opinion in
Acuna published, the opinion cannot be relied upon by a court. The California Rules
of Court provide that any opinion of a court of appeal that is not ordered published
"shall not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other action or proceeding,"
except for purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Id. 977(a)-(b).
89. See, e.g., Acuna, 929 P.2d at 601 ("Rocksprings is an urban war zone.").
90. See, e.g., id. at 603 ("Liberty unrestrained is an invitation to anarchy. Freedom
and responsibility are joined at the hip.").
91. See Arleen Jacobius, Court Approves Gang Injunctions, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997,
at 34, 34.
92. See Nicole Gaouette, L.A. to Gang Members: Don't Even Whistle, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 14, 1997, at Al (describing the injunction and the 18th Street
gang); Los Angeles Sues Alleged Gang Members (visited Feb. 4, 1998)
<http//www.instanet.com/~vct/LAGANGSUED070497.html> (same).
93. See Gaouette, supra note 92 (reporting the gang's membership at 20,000); Los
Angeles Sues Alleged Gang Members (visited Feb. 4, 1998) <http//www.instanet.com/
~vct/LAGANGSUED070497.html> (reporting the gang's membership at between 5000
and 20,000).
94. Los Angeles Sues Alleged Gang Members (visited Feb. 4, 1998) <http//www.
instanet.corn/~vct/LAGANGSUED070497.html>.
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In another highly publicized case, the City of Oceanside brought the
first anti-gang injunction in San Diego County against the Varrio Posole
Locos, Oceanside's largest and oldest street gang, as well as twenty-eight
individual defendants. 95
The Posole gang is so entrenched in
Oceanside's Eastside neighborhood, one detective for the Oceanside
Police Department estimated that 75% of residents in the neighborhood
have a family member connected to the gang. 96 The preliminary
injunction, which San Diego Superior Court Judge John S. Einhorn
issued on November 26, 1997, is substantially similar to the injunction
in Acuna.
Anti-gang injunctions will probably continue to rise across California
and may soon be used in other states. A deputy district attorney for the
County of San Diego has described the injunction against the Varrio
Posole Locos as "a good place to start." 97 Prosecuting agencies in
Illinois, Texas, Arkansas, Florida, and Arizona have approached the Los
Angeles City Attorney's office for information on anti-gang injunctions. 98 As described below, the success of the injunctions has been
and will be an important factor in their proliferation.

B.

Success

Prosecuting agencies across the State of California have raved over the
effectiveness of anti-gang injunctions. Los Angeles County prosecutors
claim that the injunctions in Pasadena and Pico-Union have reduced
crime by as much as one-third. 99 Authorities in Burbank, commenting
on the injunction in People ex rel. Fletcher v. Acosta, reported a total
cessation of gang incidents in the target neighborhood only six months
after the injunction was issued. 100 San Diego County prosecutors note
that in the eighteen months leading up to the superior court's imposition

95. See Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, and
Permanent Injunction to Abate a Public Nuisance, People v. Vania Posole Locos, No.
N76652, (Cal. Super. Ct. San Diego County Nov. 24, 1997); Gregg Moran, Injunction
Targets 28 in Gang: Judge's Broad Oceanside Order Is a County First, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, Nov. 27, 1997, at B14.
96. Declaration of Ruben Sandoval, at 4, People v. Varrio Posole Locos, N76652
(Cal. Super. Ct. San Diego County Nov. 24, 1997).
97. Moran, supra note 76 (quoting Deputy District Attorney Terri Perez).
98. Telephone Interview with Jule Bishop, supra note 70.
99. See Moran, supra note 76.
100. See Boga, supra note 24, at 485.
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of the injunction against the Varrio Posole Locos, the gang was believed
responsible for ten homicides in the Oceanside area. In the six months
since the injunction was imposed, not one homicide has occurred in the
Oceanside area in which prosecutors suspect the gang's involvement. 101
The distinct advantage of civil abatement actions, observers contend,
is that such actions stop crime before it happens. 102 They also have
the benefit of (1) bringing police and residents together to solve
community problems, (2) making unlawful otherwise lawful activity, (3)
allowing for group arrests and prosecutions, and (4) creating a list of
crimes where police, not victims, will be the only necessary percipient
witnesses. The injunctions themselves can be tailored to meet the
community's needs, and, as described supra Part II, violation of the
injunction can be punished civilly or criminally.
The injunctions have had the most success with discrete gangs that
occupy a discrete neighborhood. 103 By suing such a gang, word of the
injunction spreads immediately among the gang's ranks. When a
member is arrested for violating the injunction, news of the arrest
similarly hits the streets, creating a chilling effect on other members.
Law enforcement and prosecutors do not receive the same chilling effect,
however, with large, diffuse gangs whose membership is constantly
changing. These gangs do not have the same communication network,
so a gang member may never hear of a fellow gang member's arrest.
Police officers may also have difficulty remembering the faces of all the
members in a large, diffuse gang.
Despite law enforcement's and prosecuting agencies' claims of the
success of anti-gang injunctions, and despite the benefits these injunctions seem to offer, not all are convinced of their effectiveness. On May
28, 1993, the American Civil Liberties Union released a report
evaluating the effectiveness of Blythe Street Gang injunction. 104 In a
cover letter to Los Angeles District Attorney Gil Garcetti and Los
Angeles City Attorney James K. Hahn accompanying the report,
representatives from the ACLU wrote, "Our report reaches what we
believe may be surprising conclusions: Not only did the injunction not
lead to a reduction in violent crime and drug trafficking in the Panorama
City area as a whole, but crime increased enormously .... " 105 The

101. Telephone Interview with Susan Mazza, supra note 50.
102. See Jacobi us, supra note 9 I, at 34 (referring to statements of Los Angeles
District Attorney Gil Garcetti).
103. Telephone Interview with Jule Bishop, supra note 70.
104. See ACLU Report: False Premise/False Promise: The Blythe Street Injunction
and Its Aftermath (visited Feb. 4, 1998) <http://www.aclu-sc.org/blythe.html>.
!05. Id.
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letter continued, "We believe that these conditions were influenced
greatly and exacerbated by patterns of crime and drug trafficking that
evolved after the Blythe Street injunction." 106
Los Angeles prosecutors attacked the report as flawed. 107 One
assistant city attorney claimed, 'The report isn't worth the paper it's
printed on." 108 Even if the report supported the conclusions of the
ACLU-a question on which this Casenote does not express a view-the
injunctions may still have value.
A well-known study conducted in 1969 arrived at what is known as
"the broken-window theory." 109 According to this theory, "disorder
and crime are usually inextricably linked . . . . [I]f a window in a
building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will
soon be broken." 110 This theory has application in the context of
anti-gang injunctions, because one of the effects of such injunctions is
to limit disorderly, although otherwise legal, conduct, such as annoying
residents, playing loud music, or using profanity. By limiting disorder,
the injunctions in effect limit the number of broken windows that might
lead to other, more serious crime.
Studies have also shown that many people, particularly the elderly,
fear incivility to the same degree as actual crime:
When an interviewer asked people in a housing project where the most
dangerous spot was, they mentioned a place where young persons gathered to
drink and play music, despite the fact that not a single crime had occurred
there. In Boston public housing projects, the greatest fear was expressed by

106. Id.
107. See Moran, supra note 76.
108. Gaouette, supra note 92 (quoting Assistant City Attorney Martin Vranicar).
109. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, 31. As Wilson and Kelling describe, a Stanford
psychologist named Philip Zimbardo tested "the broken-window theory":
[Zimbardo] arranged to have an automobile without license plates parked with
its hood up on a street in the Bronx and a comparable automobile on a street
in Palo Alto, California. The car in the Bronx was attacked by "vandals"
within ten minutes of its "abandonment." The first to arrive were a family
-father, mother, and young son -who removed the radiator and battery.
Within twenty-four hours, virtually everything of value had been removed.
Then random destruction began. . . . The car in Palo Alto sat untouched for
more than a week. Then Zimbardo smashed part of it with a sledgehammer.
Soon, passersby were joining in. Within a few hours, the car had been turned
upside down and utterly destroyed.
110. Id. (emphasis in original).
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persons living in the buildings where disorderliness and incivility, not crime,
were the greatest. 111

By limiting disorder, anti-gang injunctions may lower the general fear
of residents living in the target neighborhoods, thereby improving their
quality of life. This consequence, in and of itself, speaks to the
effectiveness of this prosecutorial tool.

IV.

THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT'S OPINION IN
PEOPLE V. ACUNA

The majority opinion in Acuna rang with unusual passion. Justice
Brown, its author, seemed to enjoy the role of society's champion.
Quoting from great Western philosophers and writing in a style that
seemed, at times, self-consciously rhythmic, the court validated civil
abatement actions as a means to fight street gangs.
The majority opened its opinion by describing the terror the gang
known alternatively as Varrio Surefio Town or Varrio Sureiio (VST), and
the gang known as Varrio Surefio Locos (VSL), spread across the San
Jose neighborhood of Rocksprings. According to the court, "[t]he
people of this community are prisoners in their own homes. Violence
and the threat of violence are constant. Residents remain indoors,
especially at night. They do not allow their children to play outside."112 The court then transited to a history of the case, summarizing
the preliminary injunction itself, how the case proceeded to the Court of
Appeal, and the Court of Appeal's decision. 113
A.

The Scope of the Court's Jurisdiction

With this foundation in place, the court began its analysis, considering
generally its jurisdiction to enjoin public nuisances. The court's first
step along this course was to discuss the origin and nature of actions to
enjoin public nuisances. 114 Here, even more than elsewhere, one can
observe the opinion's manifesto-like quality. The court wrote, "Often
the public interest in tranquillity, security, and protection is invoked only
to be blithely dismissed, subordinated to the paramount right of the
individual. . . . Liberty unrestrained is an invitation to anarchy.
Freedom and responsibility are joined at the hip." 115 The court

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

362

Id. at 32.
People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 601-02 (Cal. 1997).
See id. at 602.
See id. at 602-05.
Id. at 602-03.

[VOL. 35: 343, 19981

People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

pronounced that the interests of the community are no less important
than the interests of the individual, and it observed that courts have
vindicated the rights of the community through public nuisance law
since the beginning of the sixteenth century. 116
Once it had arrived at the current state of public nuisance law, the
court drew together relevant sections of the Penal and Civil Codes to set
forth a standard for what constitutes a public nuisance. Under this
standard, to constitute a public nuisance, the act must be either offensive
to the senses, indecent, or injurious to health, and the act must substantially interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property. I17
Having set forth this standard, the court zeroed in on the scope of its
equitable jurisdiction. While American courts once experienced a trend
of expanding their jurisdiction towards what some had deemed
"government by injunction," 118 the California Supreme Court brought
this expansion to a halt in 1941, when it held that the ultimate legal
authority to declare a given act or condition a public nuisance rests with
the Legislature. 119 Working, then, under this understanding, the Acuna
court turned to whether it had the jurisdiction to enjoin an act not
independently prohibited by the criminal law. Drawing upon substantial
case law, the court held that it did. It stated:
The Court of Appeal was thus partly accurate in reasoning that "a public
nuisance is always a criminal offense," for indeed it is. It is the corollary to
that proposition-that the superior court's injunction was valid only to the
extent that it enjoined conduct that is independently proscribed by the Penal
Code-that is flawed." 0

I 16. Id. at 603.
117. Id. at 604.
I I 8. Id. at 605.
119. Id. at 606 (discussing People v. Lim, 118 P.2d 472 (Cal. 1941)).
120. Id. at 607 (internal citation omitted). As pointed out by Justice Mosk in his
dissent, the majority misread the Court of Appeal's opinion in this regard. See id. at 627
n.8 (Mosk, J., dissenting). The Court of Appeal did not conclude that only independently criminal conduct may be enjoined under public nuisance law. If the Court of Appeal
had, it certainly would not have taken six pages analyzing whether all 15 of the
non-independently-criminal provisions violated the First Amendment, were overbroad,
or were void for vagueness. See People v. Acuna, 40 Cal. Rptr.2d 589, 595-600 (Ct.
App. 1995) (analyzing the constitutionality of these provisions). In fact, the Court of
Appeal "merely concluded that the specific noncriminal conduct included within the
superior court's order could not be appropriately enjoined under general public nuisance
statutes." See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 627 n.8 (Mask, J., dissenting).
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Now that the court had established its jurisdiction in equity to enjoin
non-criminal conduct, it brought its focus to defendants' constitutional
challenges.
B.

Defendants' Constitutional Challenges to Provisions (a) and (k)
1.

First Amendment

The court first reviewed defendants' First Amendment challenges to
paragraph (a) of the preliminary injunction, which enjoined defendants
from "[s]tanding, sitting, walking, driving, gathering or appearing
anywhere in public view with any other defendant ... or any other
known 'VST' ... or ... 'VSL' member." 121 The Court of Appeal
had held that this provision violated defendants' First Amendment rights
of association. 122 The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that although
the Constitution shields from government intrusion a limited right of
association, "it does not recognize a generalized right of 'social
association. "' 123
Relying upon U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the Acuna court then
identified two kinds of associations entitled to First Amendment
protections-those with an "intrinsic" or "intimate" value, and those that
are "instrumental" to forms of religious and political expression and
activity. 124 According to the court, associations with "intrinsic" or
"intimate" value have characteristics of "relative smallness, a high degree
of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and
seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship." 125 The
court held that while gang membership may serve as a source of
personal enrichment to some of the defendants, the relationships these
defendants maintained did not rise to the level of intimacy required for
First Amendment protection. 126
With regard to the second kind of association that merits First
Amendment protection-"instrumental" associations-the court held that
"the gang [was] not an association of individuals formed 'for the purpose
of engaging in protected speech or religious activities. "' 127 The court

121. See id. at 608-09.
122. See People v. Acuna, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 589, 595-97 (1995).
123. Acuna, 929 P.2d at 608 (quoting Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989)).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 609.
127. Id. at 608 (quoting Board of Dir. of Rotary Int'! v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537,
544 (1987)).
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observed that while almost all activity an individual undertakes involves
some degree of expression, the gang's associations did not reach the
degree of expression sufficient to bring them within the bounds of
constitutional protection. 128 Because the court found that the gang
members' associations were neither of "intimate" value nor "instrumental" to forms of religious and political expression and activity, the court
denied such associations First Amendment protection.

2.

"Overbreadth"

The court rejected the Court of Appeal's holding that the terms of
provision (a) were "overbroad," as that term is understood in the context
of First Amendment litigation. The foundation for the "overbreadth"
doctrine, the court explained, "is the inhibitory effect a contested statute
may exert on the freedom of those who, although possibly subject to its
reach, are not before the court." 129 The doctrine is therefore designed
to protect third parties who, wanting to avoid the perils of indefinite
language, restrict their conduct to that which is unquestionably safe. 130
The defendants, however, confused the doctrine's purpose and argued
that the terms of the preliminary injunction suffered from "overbreadth,"
as applied to the defendants themselves. 131 Whether the terms of the
preliminary injunction were excessively broad, as applied to the named
defendants, was not within the reach of the "overbreadth" doctrine.
Instead, as the court noted, this contention would be more appropriately
addressed under the constitutional requirement that a superior court
decree "burden no more of defendants' speech than necessary to serve
the significant governmental interest at stake." 132
The court resolved the defendants' "overbreadth" challenge with ease.
One might wonder if the court would have demonstrated the same ease
if, instead of naming individual defendants, the preliminary injunction
named only the gang itself, as with the Blythe Street Gang injunc-

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
opinion,

See id. at 609.
Id. at 610.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 61 I. The court did address this constitutional requirement later in its
see id. at 614-16, as will be discussed infra Part IV.D.
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tion, 133 or named the gang as well as individual defendants, as with the
Varrio Posole Locos injunction. 134 If the gang were one of the
defendants, then third parties might restrict their conduct, unsure whether
a court would rule them "members" of the particular gang. 135 An
example would be a young person who fraternizes with bona fide gang
members and who has a gang-affiliated tattoo as an emblem of pride for
his neighborhood, and does not know if this fraternization and tattoo
qualify him in the court's eyes as bound by the injunction.13 6

3.

"Void for Vagueness"

The court next considered whether provisions (a) and (k) of the
preliminary injunction were "void for vagueness." According to the
court, the underlying concern of the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is the
due process requirement of adequate notice. 137 Everyone is entitled to
be informed of what the State commands or forbids. 138 The risk of
vague laws, beyond their failure to provide adequate notice, is their
"potential for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." 139

133. See Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, People v. Blythe Street Gang, No.
LC02025 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County Apr. 7, 1993) (naming the Blythe Street Gang
as the sole defendant). Perhaps in part because of these "overbreadth" concerns, the Los
Angeles City Attorney's office no longer sues only the gang without naming individual
defendants. See Telephone Interview with Jule Bishop, supra note 70 (remarking on this
policy).
134. See Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, People v. Varrio Posole Locos, No.
N76652 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Diego County Dec. 11, 1997) (naming the Varrio Posole
Locos, as well as 28 individual defendants).
135. See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text (discussing the ambiguities of
what constitutes gang membership).
136. Consider this real-life example: In February 1998 San Diego County
prosecutors brought civil contempt charges against David Englebrecht and Juan
Banuelos, both of whom were named individually as defendants in the Varrio Posole
Locos injunction. The two men were observed in public together, in violation of the
association ban. Also in the men's company was Mark Neenan, documented by the City
of Oceanside as a Posole gang member but not named in the injunction. Prosecutors
chose not to bring contempt charges against Mr. Neenan. However, they did prosecute
Mr. Englebrecht and Mr. Banuellos not only for their association with one another, but
also for their association with Mr. Neenan. See Application for Order to Show Cause
Re Contempt, People v. Varrio Posole Locos No. N76652 (San Diego Super. Ct. San
Diego County Feb. 20, 1998); Declaration of Ruben Sandoval in Support of Application
for Order to Show Cause Re Contempt, and in Support of Contempt, People v. Varrio
Posole Locos, No. N76652 (San Diego Super. Ct. San Diego County Feb. 20, 1998).
How is a person in Mr. Neenan's shoes, whom police document as a gang member but
who is not named in the injunction, to know whether he should restrict his conduct?
137. Acuna, 929 P.2d at 611.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 612.

366

[VOL. 35: 343, 1998]

People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

The court identified two principles as guides for applying the
"void-for-vagueness" doctrine in particular cases, 140 First, context is
crucial. Putting otherwise vague language in its proper context may give
the language constitutionally sufficient concreteness, 141 Second, no
words possess the precision of mathematical symbols. Thus, no more
than a "reasonable degree of certainty" of what a law requires or
prohibits is necessary in order for the law to pass constitutional
muster. 142
With this framework in place, the court examined provision (a), which
prohibited association with "any other known 'VST' , , , or 'VSL' , ..
member." 143 The Court of Appeal had found this provision "void for
vagueness," arguing that it might apply in a circumstance in which a
defendant was engaged in one of the prohibited activities with someone
known to the police but not known to the defendant to be a gang
member. 144 The Supreme Court rejected this argument and concluded
that the element of a gang member's personal knowledge was implied
in the provision. 145
The court then examined provision (k), which enjoined defendants
from "confronting, intimidating, annoying, harassing, threatening,
challenging, provoking, assaulting and/or battering any residents or
patrons, or visitors to 'Rocksprings' ... known to have complained
about gang activities." 146 The Court of Appeal had found this provision impermissibly vague, in part because of the knowledge requirement. 147 Applying the same reasoning that it did with respect to
provision (a), the Supreme Court found that a gang member's personal
knowledge was implied. 148
The Court of Appeal had also found that provision (k) failed to
sufficiently define the words "confront," "annoy," "provoke," "challenge," and "harass." 149 The Supreme Court disagreed, observing that
similar words had previously been upheld against claims of vagueness
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 612-13.
id. at 612.
id. at 612-13.
id. at 613 (quoting this portion of provision (a)).
People v. Acuna, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 589, 598 (1995).
Acuna, 929 P.2d at 613.
id. (quoting this portion of provision (k)).
Acuna, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599.
Acuna, 929 P.2d at 613.
Acuna, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599.

367

by the U.S. Supreme Court. 150 Moreover, interpreting these words in
the context of the instant lawsuit left "little doubt as to what kind of
conduct the decree seeks to enjoin." 151 The court provided specific
examples of that conduct, such as gang members threatening to cut out
the tongue of a young girl if the girl's mother talked to the police. 152
Given the court's expansive ability to place words in "context," the
court might have upheld other provisions that the Court of Appeal had
struck down, but which were not appealed. For instance, the Court of
Appeal struck down provision (r) of the preliminary injunction, which
prohibited "[s]ignalling to or acting as a lookout for other persons to
warn of the approach of police officers." 153 The Court of Appeal
reasoned, "This paragraph fails to define 'signaling.' It also fails to
explain how police will distinguish between those activities designed to
alert defendants to police presence, and those which might have other,
innocent intentions. It thus suffers from vagueness." 154 Putting
provision (r) into context, however, there is a "reasonable degree of
certainty" (if not plain certainty) of what activity the provision is meant
to curtail-lookouts for drug dealing. Whether the signaling takes the
form of a whistle, a wave of the hands, or the beam of a flashlight, there
is, in the words of the Supreme Court, "little doubt as to what kind of
conduct the decree seeks to enjoin." 155
C.

The STEP Act

The court rejected the defendants' contention that the STEP Act 156
is the exclusive means of enjoining criminal street gangs and thus
preempts use of the general public nuisance statutes. 157 Although the
Act includes a nuisance provision, the provision provides that "[n]othing
in this chapter shall preclude any aggrieved person from seeking any
other remedy provided by law." 158 According to the court, this

150. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 613 (referring to Madsen v. Women's Health Center,
Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 760 (1994)).
15 I. Id.
152. See id. at 613-14.
153. See Acuna, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 600.
154. Id.
155. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 613.
156. CAL. PEN. CODE§§ 186.20-196.28 (Deering Supp. 1998).
157. Acuna, 929 P.2d at 614.
158. CAL. PEN. CODE§ 186.22a(d). The STEP Act's nuisance provision is directed
to every "building or place" used by gang members as a nuisance. Id. § 186.22a(a).
The provision has received little interpretation at the appellate level since its enactment
in 1988. In Deering' s 1998 supplemental pocket part, the provision had only one
annotation. See id. § 186.22a, Notes of Decision.
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language demonstrates that the Act clearly contemplates remedies in
addition to the Act to abate criminal gang activities. 159
D.

The Limits of the Preliminary Injunction
I.

Substantive Limits

The court next analyzed the scope of the preliminary injunction as a
matter of public nuisance and constitutional law. The question of scope,
as it pertained to public nuisance law, was whether the activity enjoined
under the preliminary injunction reasonably fell within the statutory
definition of "public nuisance," as set forth by Civil Code sections 3479
and 3480. 160 The court found that it did, and in support of this finding
described the lawless, hooligan-like atmosphere that the defendants
perpetuated in Rocksprings. 161
The question of scope, as it pertained to constitutional law, was
whether provisions (a) and (k) of the preliminary injunction complied
with the standard announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Madsen v.
Womens Health Center, Inc, 162 by '"burden[ing] no more speech than
necessary to serve' a significant government interest." 163 The court
held that both provisions were in compliance with Madsen.
As for provision (a)-the association ban provision-the court
reasoned that because it is the collective conduct of gang members that
makes them such a threat and because the prohibitions enumerated in
provision (a) were not easily divisible, the preliminary injunction's
inclusion of all the prohibitions did not go beyond what was required to
abate the nuisance. 164 Moreover, the provision's ban on defendants'
speech was minimal, as the record demonstrated that the defendants
engaged in no expressive activities that were not either "unlawful or
inextricably intertwined with unlawful conduct." 165 Finally, as for the
aspect of provision (a) that prohibited a gang member from associating

159. Acuna, 929 P.2d at 614.
160. See id. at 614-15. The language of Civil Code sections 3479 and 3480 is
discussed supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
161. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 614-15.
162. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
163. Acuna, 929 P.2d at 615 (quoting Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765).
164. See id.
165. Id.
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with even a single fellow gang member (as opposed to two, three, or
more gang members), the court deferred to the trial judge, who was "in
a better position" to make such a determination. 166 The court also
emphasized that gang members may associate freely out of public view,
that provision (a) only constrained defendants' associations inside the
target area, and that line-drawing of any nature would involve "irreducible arbitrariness." 167
The court had an easier time with provision (k), which essentially
prohibited gang members from intimidating people that the defendants
knew had complained about the gangs' conduct. Because the conduct
proscribed by provision (k) consisted of threats of violence and violent
acts themselves, such conduct was not worthy of First Amendment
protection under U.S. Supreme Court and California Supreme Court
precedent. 168
The court's analysis of the constitutional standard announced by
Madsen bodes well for future scrutiny of other provisions found in
anti-gang injunctions. If the court is willing to defer to the trial judge
and also to refrain from line-drawing because of its "irreducible
arbitrariness," the Madsen standard has little bite.

2.

Those Bound by the Preliminary Injunction

The final matter for the court to determine was who could properly be
bound by the preliminary injunction. The defendants contended that
under NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 169 they could not be bound
by the injunction except on proof that each possessed "a specific intent
to further an unlawful aim embraced by that group." 170 The court
distinguished NAACP, however, and refused to apply the "specific intent
to further an unlawful aim" standard. 171 In NAACP, many of the
defendants, who were members of a local chapter of a the NAACP,
neither took part in nor ratified the isolated acts of violence by other
members that were the basis of the plaintiff's claim for business
losses. 172 By contrast, the Acuna court observed, the gang-affiliated

166. Id. at 616.
167. Id.
168. See id. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that "(t]he First Amendment does
not protect violence." See id. (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.
886,916 (1982)).
169. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
170. Acuna, 929 P.2d at 616 (quoting NMCP, 458 U.S. at 925-26).
171. See id. at 916-17.
172. NMCP, 458 U.S. at 924.
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youths in the instant matter created and sustained an urban war zone in
Rocksprings, 173
The Acuna court did find as controlling precedent the U,S, Supreme
Court cases of Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v,
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc, 174 and Madsen v, Women's Health Center,
Inc, 175 In Drivers Union, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction
restraining all union conduct, both peaceful and violent, arising out of
a labor dispute, 176 Over the union's protest that the decree violated its
members' First Amendment rights by enjoining acts of peaceful
picketing, the Court upheld the injunction and stated that courts may
"enjoin acts of picketing in themselves peaceful when they are enmeshed
with contemporaneously violent conduct which is concededly outlawed,"177
The U,S, Supreme Court in Madsen upheld an injunction that
prohibited congregating and picketing within thirty-six feet of an
abortion clinic, 178 The injunction was directed not only at the
anti-abortion organizations themselves, but at allied organizations and
"their officers, agents, members, employees and servants," 179
According to the Acuna court, Drivers Union and Madsen thus stand
for the proposition that "in a proper case," an organization and its
members are enjoinable without meeting the "specific intent to further
an unlawful aim" standard applied in NAACP, 180 This was such a
proper case, the court held, as the conduct prohibited in provisions (a)
and (k) was integral to the public nuisance that afflicted Rocksprings and
did not implicate protected First Amendment conduct 181
Having determined that this was a proper case to dispense with the
"specific intent to further an unlawful aim" standard, the court then set
about devising its own standard for who may be bound, As described
infra Part V, the standard the court arrived upon, as well as the court's
reasoning, are difficult to grasp, The court first established that

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
18 I.

Acuna, 929 P.2d at 917.
312 U.S. 287 (1941).
512 U.S. 753 (1994).
Drivers Union, 312 U.S. at 291.
Id. at 292.
Madsen, 5 l 2 U.S. at 759.
See id. at 759 n.l.
Id.
Id.
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injunctions can run to groups or its individual members. 182
stated:

It then

For present purposes, it is enough to observe that there was sufficient evidence
before the superior court to support the conclusions that the gang and its
members present in Rocksprings were responsible for the public nuisance, that
each of the individual defendants either admitted gang membership or was
identified as a gang member, and that each was observed by police officials in
the Rocksprings neighborhood. 183

The court effectively found the City of San Jose checklist for documenting gang members sufficient to identify who might properly be bound
by the injunction.
Under this standard, the court concluded that although three of the
defendants who chose to contest entry of the preliminary injunction were
not shown to have committed acts comprising specific elements of the
public nuisance, such individualized proof was not necessary based on
a showing that it was the gang, acting through its individual members,
that was responsible for the conditions in Rocksprings. 184 The court
accordingly bound all three defendants, even though the only evidence
against one of them was that she had dressed Surefio-style, claimed gang
membership, and was observed in the Rocksprings neighborhood and in
a rival gang's neighborhood. 185 The only evidence against the other
two was that each had admitted gang membership on one occasion, and
each were suspected of, but never arrested for, a possible drug offense.1s6
V.

GUILT BY ASSOCIATION

The Acuna court relied upon Drivers Union and Madsen to hold that,
"in a proper case," an organization and its members are enjoinable
without the NAACP showing that each member possessed "a specific
intent to further an unlawful aim embraced by the group." 187 Argu-

182. See id. at 618. The court stated, "Because the City could have named the
gangs themselves as defendants and proceeded against them, its decision to name
individual gang members instead does not take the case out of the familiar rule that both
the organization and the members through which it acts are subject to injunctive relief."
Id.
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. See id. (binding defendant Blanca Guzman); see also id. at 632-33 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the evidence against defendant Blanca Guzman).
186. See id. (binding defendants Miguel Moreno and Rafael Ruiz); see also id. at
633 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (discussing the evidence against Miguel Moreno and Rafael
Ruiz).
187. See id. at 616-17 (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,
925-26 (1982)).
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ably, the facts of Drivers Union and Madsen are sufficiently distinguishable that they, like NAACP, should have weak precedential force. 188
Even granting the meaning the Acuna court attached to Drivers Union
and Madsen, neither case actually proposed an alternative standard to
NAACP. The Acuna court was therefore left to adopt its own standard.
The court opened its analysis by making the empty observation that it
was the gang, acting through its membership, that created the public
nuisance in Rocksprings. 189 For the court, "membership" in the gang,
however defined, was enough to bind one to the injunction. To
determine membership, the court simply adopted the City of San Jose's
standard for documenting gang members.
To be documented as a gang member in San Jose, an individual need
only be seen in the target area and (1) admit gang membership or (2) be
identified as a gang member. 190 A person could be identified as a

188. Drivers Union is distinguishable from Acuna because the question of who
should be bound was not in issue in Drivers Union. See Milk Wagon Drivers Union of
Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941). Rather, the
question was what conduct the trial court could enjoin. See id. at 292 ("The question
which thus emerges is whether a state can choose to authorize its courts to enjoin acts
of picketing in themselves peaceful when they are enmeshed with contemporaneously
violent conduct which is concededly outlawed."). Those bound by the injunction were
easy to identify-they were card carrying union members. By contrast, identifying who
is a "gang member" is fraught with ambiguities. See infra notes 192-95 and accompanying text (describing these ambiguities). Therefore, Drivers Union appears to have little
relevance in making tough decisions about who should be bound by an injunction.
Madsen is also distinguishable from the facts of Acuna. Although one of the issues
in Madsen was who could be bound by the injunction, the focus was different. See
Madsen, 512 U.S. at 775-76 (1994). The focus was not on whether the named parties
may be bound, but on whether parties acting "in concert" with named parties may be
bound. See id. Madsen is also distinguishable because the chore of identifying who
should be bound in that case was easy. The injunction reached only those who had
protested at the clinic and who had threatened to protest at the clinic, and those who
might later act in concert with them. See id. at 758-59 & n. l. So, all defendants were
either already identifiable by their past commission of the proscribed conduct or their
threats to commit the proscribed conduct (the named parties), or they were identifiable
upon their actual commission of the proscribed act (the unnamed parties acting in
concert with named parties). The potential defendants in Acuna were not so easily
identifiable. Under Acuna's standard, it is not the commission of the proscribed acts that
determines who should be bound, it is membership in the gang. To illustrate: possession
of a beeper by a gang member may be enjoined by an anti-gang injunction, but the
possessor is subject to the injunction because of his gang membership, not simply
because of his possession.
189. Acuna, 929 P.2d at 618.
190. Id. at 623 n. l (Mosk, J., dissenting) (providing the criteria of the City of San
Jose).
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gang member if he satisfied two or more of the following: (1) wore
clothing or tattoos indicating gang affiliation or used gang hand signs;
(2) was named by two or more members of a gang as a member; (3)
actively participated in a gang crime; (4) was identified by a reliable
informant as a gang member; or (5) was observed associating with gang
members two or more times. 191 So, for instance, an individual could
be identified as a gang member if he was seen with another purported
gang member on two or more occasions and if he wore clothing
associated with the gang, such as baggy trousers.
The problem with this standard for identifying who may be bound by
the injunction is that it loses focus of the underlying cause of action-the public nuisance that the gang, acting through its members,
creates. The California Supreme Court has held that an "injunction is
not the proper remedy to prevent a person from doing an act which he
has never undertaken or threatened to undertak:e." 192 The California
Supreme Court has also held that to hold a defendant responsible for a
nuisance, it must be proved that he is responsible for the conditions
constituting the nuisance. 193 So, with respect to anti-gang injunctions,
only individual defendants who have contributed to the public nuisance
or who have threatened to contribute to the public nuisance should be
bound by the injunction. This class of persons seems broader than the
class of persons swept up under the NAACP "specific int~nt" standard.194 An individual may contribute to a public nuisance, as determined by a court, even though the prosecution cannot prove that the
individual ever had a specific intent to do so.
For instance, suppose the prosecution is able to prove that an
individual's non-criminal participation in the gang contributed to the
gang's blight on the neighborhood. However, the prosecution cannot
prove that this individual ever had a specific intent to further an
unlawful aim of the gang, because the prosecution does not have
evidence of any unlawful acts committed by the individual. If the court
looks beyond the specific intent standard, and instead looks at what

191. See id.
192. City and County of San Francisco v. Market St. Ry. Co., 213 P.2d 780, 785
(Cal. 1950) (quoting 14 Cal. Jur. 208 (1945)). Put somewhat differently, the California
Supreme Court has also stated, "The complaint ... discloses ... not one illegal act on
the part of the [defendants]. A court of equity will not restrain any person from doing
that which the law authorizes that person to do." Dammann v. Hydraulic Clutch, 187
P. I 069, I 070 (Cal. 1920). If this language is applied to anti-gang injunctions, the result
is that if an individual has not contributed to the public nuisance and is only doing that
which the law authorizes him to do, his conduct may not be enjoined.
193. Neuber v. Royal Realty Co., 195 P.2d 501, 519 (Cal. 1948), overruled on other
grounds by Porter v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 313 P.2d 854, 856-57 (Cal. 1957).
194. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 616-17 (discussing the NAACP standard).
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act1v1t1es and behavior in fact constitutes the public nuisance, this
individual should be bound by the injunction.
The Acuna court failed to make a connection between how an
individual satisfying San Jose's criteria for gang membership necessarily
contributes to the public nuisance it was the injunction's purpose to
prevent. For instance, why, at face value, does a person who once
admitted gang membership necessarily contribute to the public nuisance?
The court's failure to make this connection was a grave oversight. As
Justice Chin in his part-dissent explained:
Whether a court can enjoin individuals based on group membership depends
on the nature of the group and the implications of membership under the
circumstances. In the case of some groups, membership evidences a common
purpose. . . . But the Surefio street gangs at issue in this case have fluid
membership, no organizational structure, and no ex~ress purpose except perhaps
to compete with members of rival Nortefio gangs. 95

The gist of Justice Chin's observations is that an individual's "membership" in a street gang is not a guarantee that the individual contributes
to the public nuisance perpetuated generally by fellow gang members.
Justice Chin's observations ring especially true when a city identifies
membership in a gang under liberal criteria, as did the City of San Jose.
Social scientists support Justice Chin's theory on the loose implications of "gang membership." 196 One commentator has noted:
Even if there is agreement on exactly what a gang is, the concept of
"membership" is elusive. By all definitions, gangs are loosely structured; they
don't issue membership cards or hold weekly meetings. Law enforcement
officials admit that there are many different levels of gang membership. Thus,
to simply identify a person as a "gang member" conveys little about that
person's true level of involvement or activity. 197

This commentator added that many members join gangs not for criminal
motivations, but for recognition, protection, and brotherhood. 198
Considering the range of involvement one can have in a criminal street
gang, it is evident that borrowing the City of San Jose's standard for

195. Id. at 62 I (Chin, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
196. See, e.g., GEORGE W. KNOX, AN INTRODUCTION TO GANGS 20 (1991) (nothing
that gangs have varying membership expectations); SPERGEL, supra note 8, at 83-85
(identifying "types" of gang members); Klein, supra note 10, at 520 (labeling a
defendant's gang status, at bottom "a judgment call").
197. See Burrell, supra note IO, at 750 (footnotes omitted).
198. Id.
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documenting gang members and using 1t m the context of anti-gang
injunctions for determining who should be bound is deficient in two
respects. First, the standard does not define gang membership by criteria
that are necessarily significant to determining who contributes to the
public nuisance.
Second, the standard does not require current
participation in the gang's activities. 199 Depending on the City of San
Jose's internal policies for undocumenting former gang members, it may
have been years since a documented gang member contributed to the
public nuisance.
In applying such a liberal standard for who may be bound by an
anti-gang injunction, perhaps the court was not appreciating the
implications of such a standard on individual defendants, both from a
personal and from a constitutional perspective. From a personal
perspective, the effect of being bound may be immense. Unlike the
union members in Drivers Union 200 who were prohibited from picketing, and unlike the anti-abortion demonstrators in Madsen 201 who were
given noise and buffer restrictions, the defendants of an anti-gang
injunction are typically prohibited from engaging in a range of otherwise
legal conduct (at least in open view in the target area) that is inseparable
from one's quality of life. A defendant may find himself unable to fix
his garage door because he cannot possess a screwdriver, unable to hold
a job as a deliveryman because he cannot possess a beeper, and unable
to play in the local softball tournament because he cannot possess a
baseball bat. The preliminary injunction against the Varrio Posole Locos
in San Diego County named a father and his son as individual defen-

199. The City of San Jose's standard is much like the City of Oceanside's in this
respect. Once an individual has been documented as a gang member in the City of
Oceanside, the individual must remain inactive in the gang for five years to become
undocumented. Testimony of Detective Ruben Sandoval, Hearing for Order to Show
Cause Re Contempt, People v. Varrio Posole Locos, N76652 (San Diego Super. Ct. San
Diego County Apr. 17, 1998). Any field contact where the individual is observed in a
gang setting, which includes association with other gang members, restarts the
"documentation point." Id. An individual's incarceration in county jail or prison tolls
the five-year period. Id. Clearly a person can retain his status as a documented gang
member for years after he has stopped contributing to the public nuisance afflicting the
target neighborhood.
200. 312 U.S. 287 (1940).
201. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
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dants. 202 Presumably the association ban provision applies equally to
the two of them, as it would to all other defendants.
From a constitutional perspective, the Acuna standard may deprive
particular individual defendants of fundamental liberty interests. The
California Supreme Court has stated, "Personal liberty is a fundamental
interest, second only to life itself, as an interest protected under both the
California and United States Constitutions." 203 The court continued,
"It is beyond dispute that a principal ingredient of personal liberty is
'freedom from bodily restraint. "' 204 Freedom from bodily restraint
means more than the right to go where one chooses, but also includes
being free to use all one's faculties, to live where one wants, and to earn
a livelihood by any lawful calling. 205 A law interfering with this
liberty "can be upheld only under the police power, and ... the police
power can be rightfully exercised only when the statute in question is for
the protection of the public safety, the public health, or the public morals."206 If binding a particular defendant does not contribute to public
safety, perhaps that defendant's constitutional liberty interests are being
infringed.
The Acuna standard is therefore pragmatically and constitutionally
deficient in drawing a connection between who may be bound and the
public nuisance sought to be cured. As proposed earlier, 207 this
connection can be maintained if the injunction binds only those
individual defendants who have contributed to the public nuisance or
who have threatened to contribute to the public nuisance. Certainly
those who meet the NAACP "specific intent to further an unlawful aim"
standard 208 contribute to the public nuisance. Whether one's member-

202. See Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, People v. Varrio Posole Locos, No.
N76652 (Cal. Super Ct. San Diego County Dec. 11, 1997) (naming Richard Jaime and
Richard Jaime, Jr. as defendants). A reporter who attended the TRO hearing described
this exchange: "As the hearing came to a close, prisoner Richard Jaime asked the judge
if the TRO meant that he could not associate with his son, also in chains. If nonplussed,
[Judge) Einhorn didn't show it. 'Duly noted,' he deadpanned." Logan Jenkins, Ganging
upon Bad Eggs Good for All?, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Nov. 28, 1997, at Bl.
203. In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 1289 (Cal. 1977) (quoting People v. Olivas,
551 P.2d 375, 384 (Cal. I 976)).
204. Id. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
205. See Ex parte Drexel, 82 P. 429, 430 (Cal. 1905).
206. Id.
207. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
208. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 925-26 (1982) (setting forth
this standard).
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ship in a gang, in and of itself, can contribute to the public nuisance
requires an examination of the effects of gang membership.
Law enforcement officials have remarked that it is the combination of
gang members that makes street gangs so dangerous. 209 An individual
acting alone does not wield the same power as he would with the
organizational support of a gang. 210 Indeed, the California Legislature,
in its enacting the STEP Act, stated, "It is the intent of the Legislature
. . . to seek the eradication of criminal activity by street gangs by
focusing upon patterns of criminal gang activity and upon the organized
nature of street gangs, which together, are the chief source of terror
created by street gangs. " 211
If gangs draw power from their numbers, then at some point a
person's mere participation in a gang contributes to the harm and public
nuisance the gang creates. According to one assistant city attorney for
the City of Los Angeles, "If a guy is out on the corner exhibiting
himself as a gang member, with tattoos or clothing or whatever, that's
enough to tighten a gang's stronghold on a neighborhood. Really, that's
enough. It reminds everyone around who's in charge." 212
Of course, "gang members" vary in their degree of commitment. Only
gang members who attain a certain level of visibility and involvement
in the gang would have any realistic effect on the gang's negative impact
on a community. If gang membership can be sufficient to bind someone
to an injunction, a court must have some standard that interprets a gang
member's level of involvement.

209. Speaking about the Varrio Posole Locos, Susan Mazza, an special assistant
district attorney for San Diego County, stated, "People in the neighborhood say that
when many of these boys are alone, they're OK. It's the group activity we're trying to
break up." See Moran, supra note 76 (quoting Mazza). Ruben Sandoval, who has
qualified as a gang expert in municipal and superior courts throughout Southern
California. attested in his declaration in support of the City of Oceanside·s complaint
against the Varrio Posole Locos that "gatherings of Posole gang members are ...
dangerous and must be disrupted. My experience indicates that when Posole gang
members loiter or are in groupings, they are armed and plotting criminal activities.
These gatherings need to be dispersed to prevent further acts of crime." Declaration of
Ruben Sandoval, at 2, People v. Varrio Posole Locos, No. N76652 (Cal. Super. Ct. San
Diego County Nov. 19, 1997).
210. The declaration of Officer Michael Niehoff, which the Acuna court quoted in
its First Amendment analysis, is informative on the power that gang membership confers
on an individual. Niehoff attested, "[T]he gang entity provides protection to the
individual members, allowing them to establish areas where they can conduct their
illegal activities. The protective shield of the gang has allowed individual members to
commit such crimes as narcotics trafficking that result in personal gain." People v.
Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 615 (Cal. 1997).
211. CAL. PEN. CODE§ 186.21 (Deering Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
212. Telephone Interview with Jule Bishop, supra note 70.
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Many jurisdictions have a checklist of criteria, as did the City of San
Jose, for documenting gang members. 213 San Jose's standard was
quite liberal, and many jurisdictions require more to identify one as a
gang member. For instance, in the City of Oceanside, a person is not
identified as a gang member simply because of a self-admission-the
individual must also meet one of the City's other five criteria, 214 This
more stringent checklist still does not ensure that all those meeting it
necessarily contribute to the public nuisance, While Oceanside's
checklist may require more evidence of mere "membership," it still lacks
any indicia of the level of an individual's current involvement in the
gang.
Checklists that require criminal or disorderly conduct, such as those
found under South Dakota, 215 North Dakota, 216 and Florida217 stat-

2 I 3. According to one survey of representatives from 254 organizations and
agencies dealing with gang problems, the most frequent elements used to define a gang
member were symbols or symbolic behavior, self-admission, identification by others, and
association with gang members. See SPERGEL, supra note 8, at 24 (summarizing this
survey).
214. The Oceanside Police Department applies the following criteria for identifying
an individual as a member of a criminal street gang: (I) admissions or claims of gang
membership; (2) arrested while participating with other gang members; (3) wears
clothing, or has tattoos or other insignia that is associated with a particular gang; (4)
close association with other gang members confirmed through contacts; and (5) reliable
information puts subject with gang. In order to be documented as a gang member, an
individual must meet two of the five criteria. See Declaration of Colin Mccaughey, at
5, People v. Varrio Posole Locos, No. N76652 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Diego County Nov.
18, 1997).
215. Under South Dakota's Riot and Unlawful Assembly Act, a "street gang
member" is a person who engages in a "pattern of street gang activity" and meets two
or more of a list of criteria similar to that of San Jose's. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 22-10-14(2) (Michie 1997). A "pattern of street gang activity" is defined as "the
commission, attempted commission or solicitation by any member or members of a street
gang of two or more felony or violent misdemeanor offenses on separate occasions
within a three-year period for the purpose of furthering gang activity."
Id.
§ 22-10-14(3).
216. Under North Dakota's anti-gang statutes, to "(p]articipate in a criminal street
gang" means "to act in concert with a criminal street gang with intent to commit or with
the intent that any other person associated with the criminal street gang will commit one
or more predicate gang crimes." N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-06.2-01(4) (Supp. 1997).
217. Under Florida's Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, as originally
enacted, a "criminal street gang member" is a person "who engages in a pattern of
criminal street gang activity and meets two or more of' a list of criteria similar to that
of San Jose's. See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 874.03 (West Supp. 1994). A 1996 amendment
to subsection 874.03(2) changed this wording to read "who is a member of a criminal
street gang as defined in subsection (I) and who meets two or more or more of [the
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utes, may shed light on an individual's level of involvement in the gang,
but may be underinclusive for purposes of anti-gang injunctions.
Legitimate gang members who contribute to the public nuisance
perpetuated by the gang may exist, but they would not meet the
definition of "gang member" under their state statutes because they had
never been caught participating in the requisite criminal or disorderly
conduct. As is evident, any kind of checklist approach to identifying
who should be bound by an anti-gang injunction has flaws. What a
court needs is a flexible standard that still somehow identifies a level of
commitment to a gang that indicates contribution to the public nuisance.
Such a standard is available under California's STEP Act 218 and
cases interpreting the Act. Although the STEP Act does not technically
define "gang membership," and although it does not criminalize mere
gang membership, the Act does identify a level of commitment to a
street gang that was viewed as legislatively significant. The Act
provides that "[a]ny person who actively participates in any criminal
street gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged
in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes,
furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that
gang, shall be punished by ...." 219 The key language is "actively
participates." Courts of appeal have held that to qualify as an active
participant under this statute, "a defendant must have a relationship with
a criminal street gang which is (1) more than nominal, passive, inactive
or purely technical and (2) the person must devote all, or a substantial
part of his time and efforts to the criminal street gang. " 220
Two recent courts of appeal cases have further developed this
standard. In People v. Castenada, 221 defendant Castenada appealed his
conviction for participation in a criminal street gang in violation of Penal
Code section 186.22(a). Castenada argued that the evidence was
insufficient as a matter of law to establish he actively participated in the
gang. 222 To prove Castenada was an active participant, prosecutors
offered evidence that (I) at the time of Castenada's arrest for violation
of section 186.22(a), he was also arrested for and later convicted of two
robberies that were for the benefit of the gang, (2) police had observed
him in the fourteen months before his arrest in the company of other

same criteria]." See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.03(2) (West Supp. 1997).
218. See CAL. PEN. CODE§§ 186.20-196.28 (Deering Supp. 1998).
219. See id. § 186.22(a) (emphasis added).
220. People v. Gamez, 286 Cal. Rptr. 894, 902 (1991 ); People v. Green, 278 Cal.
Rptr. 140, 146 (1991); People v. Rodriguez, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 660, 664 n.2 (1993).
221. 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 200 (1998).
222. Id. at 20 I.
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gang members on at least four occasions, and (3) in the fourteen months
before Castenada's arrest, he admitted on three occasions that he "kicked
back" with the gang, which according to the prosecutor's gang expert
were admissions of gang membership. 223
The Court of Appeal for the Fourth District affirmed Castenada's
conviction under this evidence. The court rejected Castenada's argument
that "active participation" requires a leadership role. 224 On the question whether Castenada devoted "all or a substantial portion of his time"
to the gang, the court rejected his argument that such a determination
cannot be made without quantifying the amount of time he spent with
the gang. A "substantial" amount of time, according to the court, does
not mean any particular amount or percentage. Instead, "substantial"
means "true or real; not imaginary. " 225
Another recent case that helps flesh out the "active participation"
standard is People v. Robles. 226 In Robles, defendant Robles was
charged with felony carrying a loaded gun on his person while an active
gang member, in violation of Penal Code section 12031, subdivisions
(a)(l) and (a)(2)(C). 227 Robles successfully moved to reduce the
charge to misdemeanor carrying a loaded gun on his person in violation
of section 12031 subdivisions (a)(l) and (a)(2)(f) on the ground that the
evidence was insufficient to establish that he was an active gang
member. 228 Section 12031 explicitly borrows Penal Code section
186.22(a)'s standard for "active participant," making active participation
in a gang the difference between committing a felony and a misdemeanor.229

To prove Robles was an active participant in La Mirada Locos, a
criminal street gang, prosecutors offered evidence that ( 1) Robles
admitted he was "jumped in" as a member of the gang, and (2) Robles
admitted he "hung around" with members of the gang. 230 The prosecution offered no evidence that Robles engaged in gang activities with

223.
224.
225.
1996)).
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id. at 202.
Id. at 202-03 (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1791 (3d. ed.
71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 877 (1998).
Id. at 878.
Id.
Id. at 879.
Id.
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members of La Mirada Locos. In fact, evidence showed that defendant
went "back and forth" between La Mirada Locos and an entirely
different gang. 231
The Court of Appeal for the Second District affirmed the trial court,
holding that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law that Robles
was an active participant in La Mirada Locos. 232 Although the court
found in favor of Robles, it noted in dictum that active participation does
not require "willful promotion, furtherance or assistance in felonious
criminal conduct by gang members with knowledge that gang members
engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity." 233
The "actively participates" standard has advantages. First, it has
already survived "vagueness" challenges at the appellate level. 234
Second, it offers flexibility. Courts can look beyond the checklist
approach of local cities and instead apply a "totality of the circumstances" analysis. Third, the "actively participates" standard has already been
interpreted at the appellate level, providing trial courts with some
benchmark for its application. Fourth, the standard has already been
applied in certain crimes outside the STEP Act, such as it has with Penal
Code section 1203 I. Fifth, the standard includes a temporal requirement, as the participation must be current. Finally, and most importantly, the "actively participates" standard speaks to a person's level of
commitment to a gang that indicates the person's participation contributes to the public nuisance at hand.
In naming individual defendants to an anti-gang injunction, many
prosecuting agencies already require more evidence against each
defendant than is necessary simply to document the defendant as a gang
member. For instance, the City Attorney's office for the City of Los
Angeles has a policy that it will not name a defendant in his individual
capacity unless the City has documented three gang-related contacts in
the previous eighteen months. 235 The District Attorney's office for San
Diego County claimed that it provided evidence against the individual
defendants "above and beyond" what was required simply to document
them as gang members. 236 For prosecuting agencies such as these,
satisfying the "actively participates" standard will require little, if any,
adjustment.

231. Id.
232. Id. at 882.
233. Id. at 88 I.
234. See People v. Green, 278 Cal. Rptr. 140, 146 (1991) ("[W]e see little
likelihood that the phrase will permit arbitrary law enforcement or provide inadequate
notice to potential offenders."); People v. Gamez, 286 Cal. Rptr. 894, 902 (1991).
235. Telephone Interview with Jule Bishop, supra note 70.
236. Telephone Interview with Susan Mazza, supra note 50.
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Drawing all this together, to avoid the threat of guilt by association
and to ensure that all defendants under an anti-gang injunction are
justifiably bound, courts should insist upon a showing that each
defendant either ( 1) "actively participates" in a criminal street gang, as
this concept has been developed in the STEP Act237 and cases interpreting the Act, or (2) possesses a specific intent to further an unlawful
aim embraced by the gang. A showing of either alternative demonstrates
that the individual defendant in some way contributes to the public
nuisance which it is the injunction's purpose to end.
VI.

CONCLUSION

One commentator has observed that the 1980s were the FBI's finest
hour. After years spent infiltrating the Italian Mafia and gathering
intelligence, the FBI "pulled in the nets" and crippled the Mafia's
power. 238 The end of this century could be the finest hour for
California's law enforcement agencies. Civil abatement actions have the
capability to unlock street gangs' strongholds on urban neighborhoods
across the state. 239 By keeping gang members from combining, by
taking away the tools and means by which they conduct their criminal
activities, and by putting them in jail, injunctions may do for California
what legislation, special prosecuting units, and gang sweeps could not.
The California Supreme Court in People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna 240
ensured that anti-gang injunctions will have longevity in California,
absent any disruption from the nation's highest court. Although Acuna
addressed only two provisions of the injunction in question, the tenor of
the opinion and its narrow interpretations of the "vagueness" doctrine
and the "Madsen" test2 41 test bode well for constitutional scrutiny of
other common provisions.

237. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ I 86.20-196.28 (Deering Supp. 1998).
238. See WILLIAM KLEINKNECHT, THE NEW ETHNIC MOBS 17 (1996).
239. Recent statistics from the Orange County District Attorney's Office are
encouraging. The D.A. tallied 39 gang-related homicides across the county in 1997,
down from 42 in 1996 and 70 in I 995. The number of gang members logged in the
county's data base dropped for the first time in a decade, down from 24,191 in 1996 to
18,768 in 1997. See Jeff Collins, Crime by Gangs on Decline, DA Says, THE ORANGE
COUNTY REGISTER, Feb. 11, 1998, at A I.
240. 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. I 997).
241. See supra Part IV (discussing the court's interpretations of the "vagueness"
doctrine and the Madsen test).
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In all the frenzy of anti-gang injunctions, one should not overlook the
impact such injunctions have on the constitutional liberties of those
whom they bind. The Acuna court may have done just that, employing
a standard that is not rooted in precedent or practical experience. Trial
courts entertaining anti-gang injunctions in the future should insist upon
a showing the each named defendant either contributed to or threatened
to contribute to the public nuisance at hand. The prosecution could
demonstrate that a defendant contributed to the public nuisance if it (1)
offers evidence of specific instances in which the defendant had
contributed to the nuisance, or if it (2) offers evidence that the defendant
had realized a level of involvement in the gang such that the involvement strengthened the gang's power and perpetuated its force as a public
nuisance.

EDSON MCCLELLAN
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APPENDIX A
PEOPLE V. VARRIO POSOLE LOCOS, No. 766S2
(CAL. SUPER. CT. SAN DIEGO COUNTY FILED Nov. 24, 1997)
INFORMATION IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION•
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